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Abstract 
This article presents results from the first statistically significant study of traffic forecasts 
in transportation infrastructure projects. The sample used is the largest of its kind, 
covering 210 projects in 14 nations worth US$58 billion. The study shows with very 
high statistical significance that forecasters generally do a poor job of estimating the 
demand for transportation infrastructure projects. The result is substantial downside 
financial and economic risk. Forecasts have not become more accurate over the 30-year 
period studied. If techniques and skills for arriving at accurate demand forecasts have 
improved over time, as often claimed by forecasters, this does not show in the data. For 
nine out of ten rail projects passenger forecasts are overestimated; average 
overestimation is 106 percent. For 72 percent of rail projects, forecasts are overestimated 
by more than two thirds. For 50 percent of road projects the difference between actual 
and forecasted traffic is more than ±20 percent; for 25 percent of road projects the 
difference is larger than ±40 percent. Forecasts for roads are more accurate and more 
balanced than for rail with no significant difference between the frequency of inflated 
versus deflated forecasts. But for both rail and road projects, the risk is substantial that 
demand forecasts are wrong by a large margin. The causes of inaccuracy in forecasts are 
different for rail and road projects, with political causes playing a larger role for rail than 
for road. The cure is more accountability and reference class forecasting. Highly 
inaccurate traffic forecasts combined with large standard deviations translate into large 
financial and economic risks. But such risks are typically ignored or downplayed by 
planners and decision makers, to the detriment of social and economic welfare. The 
article presents the data and approach with which planners may begin valid and reliable 
risk assessment. 
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Introduction 
Despite the enormous sums of money being spent on transportation infrastructure, 
surprisingly little systematic knowledge exists about the costs, benefits, and risks 
involved. The literature lacks statistically valid answers to the central and self-evident 
question of whether transportation infrastructure projects perform as forecasted. When a 
project underperforms, this is often explained away as an isolated instance of unfortunate 
circumstance; it is typically not seen as the particular expression of a general pattern of 
underperformance in transportation infrastructure projects. Because knowledge is 
wanting in this area of research, until now it has been impossible to validly refute or 
confirm whether underperformance is the exception or the rule.  
 In three previous articles we answered the question of project performance in 
detail as regards costs and cost-related risks. We found that projects do not perform as 
forecasted in terms of costs; almost nine out of ten projects fall victim to significant cost 
escalation. We also investigated the causes and cures of such underperformance 
(Flyvbjerg, Holm, and Buhl 2002, 2003, 2004; see also Flyvbjerg, Bruzelius and 
Rothengatter 2003). In this article we focus on the benefit side of investments and 
answer the question of whether projects perform as forecasted in terms of demand and 
revenue risks. We compare forecasted performance in terms of demand with actual 
performance for a large number of transportation infrastructure projects. Knowledge 
about cost risk, benefit risk, and compound risk is crucial to planners and decision 
makers when developing projects and deciding which to build and which not. For 
transportation infrastructure projects the costs and benefits involved often run in the 
hundreds of millions of dollars, with risks being correspondingly high. 
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 As pointed out by Pickrell (1990) and Richmond (1998), estimates of the 
financial viability of projects are heavily dependent on the accuracy of traffic demand 
forecasts. Such forecasts are also the basis for socio-economic and environmental 
appraisal of transportation infrastructure projects. According to the experiences gained 
with the accuracy of demand forecasting in the transportation sector, covering traffic 
volumes, spatial traffic distribution and distribution between transportation modes, there 
is evidence that demand forecasting--like cost forecasting, and despite all scientific 
progress in modeling--is a major source of uncertainty and risk in the appraisal of 
transportation infrastructure projects. 
 Traffic forecasts are routinely used to dimension the construction of 
transportation infrastructure projects. Here accuracy in forecasts is a point of 
considerable importance to the effective allocation of scarce funds. For example, 
Bangkok's US$2 billion Skytrain was hugely overdimensioned because the passenger 
forecast were 2.5 times higher than actual traffic. As a result, station platforms are too 
long for the shortened trains that now operate the system, a large number of trains and 
cars are idly parked in the train garage because there is no need for them, terminals are 
too large, etc. The project company has ended up in financial trouble and even though 
urban rail is probably a good idea for a congested and air-polluted city like Bangkok, 
overinvesting in idle capacity is hardly the best way to use resources, and especially not 
in a developing nation where capital for investment is scarce. Conversely, a UK National 
Audit Office study identified a number of road projects that were underdimensioned 
because traffic forecasts were too low. This, too, led to multi-million-dollar 
inefficiencies, because it is much more expensive to add capacity to existing fully used 
roads than it is to build the capacity up front (National Audit Office 1988). For these and 
other reasons, accuracy in traffic forecasts matter. 
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 Nevertheless, rigorous studies of accuracy are rare. Where such studies exist, they 
are characteristically small-N research, that is, they are single-case studies or they cover 
only a sample of projects too small or too uneven to allow systematic, statistical analyses 
(Brooks and Trevelyan 1979, Fouracre et al. 1990, Fullerton and Openshaw 1985, Kain 
1990, Mackinder and Evans 1981, National Audit Office 1988 and 1992, Pickrell 1990, 
Richmond 1998, Walmsley and Pickett 1992,  Webber 1976, World Bank 1994). Despite 
their value in other respects, with these and other studies, it has so far been impossible to 
give statistically satisfying answers to questions about how accurate traffic forecasts are 
for transportation infrastructure projects. 
 The objective of the present study has been to change this state of affairs by 
establishing a sample of transportation infrastructure projects that is sufficiently large to 
permit statistically valid answers to questions of accuracy. In addition to this intellectual 
objective, it has been a practical objective to give planners the tools for carrying out 
realistic and valid risk assessment of projects as regards travel demand. Existing studies 
almost all conclude there is a strong tendency for traffic forecasts to be overestimated 
(Mackinder and Evans  1981: 25; National Audit Office 1985: app. 5.16; World Bank 
1986; Fouracre et al. 1990: 1, 10; Pickrell 1990: x; Walmsley and Pickett 1992: 2; 
Thompson 1993: 3-4). Below we will show that this conclusion is a consequence of the 
small samples used in existing studies; it does not hold for the project population. When 
we enlarge the sample of projects by a factor 10-20 to a more representative one, we find 
a different picture, where, for road projects, the forecasting problem is not simply one of 
overestimated traffic, whereas for rail, overestimation is very much the problem. 
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Measuring Inaccuracy in Traffic Forecasts 
Traffic forecasts are routinely used to justify and to dimension the construction of 
transportation infrastructure projects. In order to estimate the accuracy of such forecasts 
it is necessary to compare forecasted with actual traffic. We follow common practice and 
define the inaccuracy of a traffic forecast as actual minus forecasted traffic in percentage 
of forecasted traffic. Actual traffic is counted for the first year of operations (or the 
opening year). Forecasted traffic is the traffic estimate for the first year of operations (or 
the opening year) as estimated at the time of decision to build the project. Thus the 
forecast is the estimate available to decision makers on the basis of which they made the 
decision to build the project in question. If no estimate was available at the time of 
decision to build, then the closest available estimate was used, typically a later estimate 
resulting in a conservative bias in our measure for inaccuracy. With this definition of 
inaccuracy, perfect accuracy is indicated by zero; an inaccuracy of minus 40 percent, for 
example, would indicate that actual traffic were 40 percent lower than forecasted traffic, 
whereas an inaccuracy of plus 40 percent would mean that actual traffic were 40 percent 
higher than forecasted traffic. 
 
FIRST YEAR AS BASIS FOR COMPARISON 
Planners and promoters sometimes object to this way of measuring inaccuracy in traffic 
forecasts (Flyvbjerg, Bruzelius, and Rothengatter 2003). They say various forecasts are 
made at different stages of planning and implementation with forecasts typically 
becoming more accurate over time. Thus the forecast at the time of making the decision 
to build is far from final. It is only to be expected, therefore, that such an early estimate 
would be highly inaccurate, and it would be unfair to use this estimate as the basis for 
assessing the accuracy of traffic forecasting, or so the objection goes. We defend this 
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method, however, because when the focus is on decision making, and hence on the 
accuracy of the information available to decision makers, then it is exactly the traffic 
forecasted at the time of making the decision to build that is of primary interest. 
Otherwise it would be impossible to evaluate whether decisions are informed or not. 
Forecasts made after the decision to build are by definition irrelevant to this decision. 
Whatever the reasons are for inaccurate forecasts, legislators and citizens--or private 
investors in the case of privately funded projects--are entitled to know the uncertainty of 
forecasted traffic and revenues. Otherwise transparency and accountability suffer. We 
furthermore observe that if the inaccuracy of early traffic estimates were simply a matter 
of incomplete information and inherent difficulties in predicting a distant future, as 
project promoters and forecasters often say it is, then we would expect inaccuracies to be 
random or close to random. Inaccuracies, however, have a striking and highly interesting 
bias, as we will see below.  
 Planners and promoters also sometimes object to using traffic in the first year of 
operations (or in the opening year) as the basis for measuring inaccuracy in forecasts. A 
manager at Eurotunnel, the owner of the Channel tunnel, which is one of the projects we 
study, put it in the following manner in a comment on some of our previous work: "[I]t is 
misleading to make judgements about success or failure based on traffic revenues in the 
initial start-up years of the project" (letter from Eurotunnel to the authors 1999). If 
projects experience start-up problems, which was very much the case for the Chunnel, 
then this may initially affect traffic negatively, but it would only be temporarily and it 
would be misleading to measure inaccuracy of forecasts on this basis, according to this 
argument. When start-up problems are over, normal operations will ensue, traffic will 
increase, and this should be the basis on which inaccuracy is measured, the argument 
continues. Furthermore, it takes time before travelers effectively discover and make use 
of a new transportation facility and change their travel behavior accordingly. Inertia is a 
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factor. A project with lower-than-forecasted traffic during the first year of operations 
may well catch up with the forecast a few years down the line and it would be more 
appropriate to measure inaccuracy on that basis. If the first year of operations is used as 
the basis for comparison, the result would be the identification of too many 
underperforming projects, or so the opponents to using this basis argue. 
 At first sight the argument sounds convincing, and in principle (as opposed to in 
practice) there is nothing which prevents using another time period than first year of 
operations as the basis for measuring inaccuracy. One might, for example, decide to use 
the fifth year of operations, because start-up problems might be expected to be ironed out 
by then; while important external changes in for instance land use will not have 
developed fully at this time either. Upon closer study, however, there are the following 
reasons for staying with first year of operations as the basis for measuring inaccuracy.  
 First, for projects for which we have data on actual and forecasted traffic 
covering more than one year after operations begin, it turns out that projects with lower-
than-forecasted traffic during the first year of operations also tend to have lower-than-
forecasted traffic in later years. Thus using first year of operations as the basis for 
measuring inaccuracy appear not often to result in the error of identifying projects as 
underperforming that would not be identified as such if a different time period were used 
as the basis for comparison. Actual traffic apparently does not quickly catch up with 
forecasted traffic for this type of project, and sometimes it never does. A follow-up study 
of seven of the ten urban rail projects analyzed by Pickrell (1990) showed no significant 
gains in patronage over time; for Baltimore, Buffalo, and Pittsburgh patronage actually 
dropped over time (Richmond 1998). For the Channel tunnel, more than five years after 
opening to the public, Eurostar train passengers numbered only 45 percent of that 
forecasted for the opening year; rail freight traffic was 40 percent of that forecasted; the 
result has been several near-bankruptcies. For the Humber bridge in the UK, 16 years 
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after opening to the public actual traffic was still only about half of that forecasted. In 
Denmark, it took more than 20 years for actual traffic on the New Little Belt bridge to 
catch up with forecasted traffic, and for several years the difference between forecasted 
and actual traffic grew larger instead of smaller. Such findings fit well with 
Mierzejewski's (1995: 31-32) observation that the conventional wisdom in forecasting, 
that in the long run forecasting errors tend to cancel each other out, is wrong; errors often 
reinforce each other with the result that inaccuracy becomes larger when measured 
against later years as compared to when measured against the first year of operations. 
Following this logic, using first year of operations as the basis for measuring inaccuracy 
would tend to underestimate overall inaccuracy of traffic forecasts. 
 Second, sightseeing traffic may be substantial during the first months of 
operations for the type of large-scale transportation infrastructure project we focus on 
here, many of which are architectural and engineering marvels, in addition to being 
prosaic transportation machines designed to get people and goods from point A to point 
B as efficiently as possible. Sightseeing traffic is traffic attracted by a project on the basis 
of people's desire to see and try the new transportation facility in question, for instance a 
new bridge or a new rail line. To illustrate, for the Øresund bridge between Sweden and 
Denmark, road traffic during the first month of operations was 19 percent higher than 
traffic for the same month one year later. The difference between the two months can 
mainly be ascribed to sightseeing traffic, which was somewhat lower than expected by 
the project company (Trafikministeriet, Finansministeriet and Sund & Bælt Holding, Ltd. 
2002: App. 4:2). Sightseeing traffic may help offset the possible negative impacts on 
travel demand from start-up problems etc. mentioned above, at least for projects that are 
sufficiently attractive in the public's eye. The existence of such countervailing influences 
on traffic during the start-up phase of projects help explain why first-year-of-operations 
tend to be a fairly precise basis for measuring inaccuracy in traffic forecasts. 
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 Third, it may be observed as an empirical fact that forecasters and planners 
typically use first-year-of-operations as the principal basis for making their forecasts. 
For a given project, this is generally the main forecast presented to decision makers and 
it forms part of the information decision makers have at hand in making their decision of 
whether to build or not. If we want to evaluate whether such decisions are informed, as 
we do here, then it is the accuracy of this forecast that must be evaluated and we 
therefore need to compare actual traffic in the first year of operations with forecasted 
traffic for that year. 
 Fourth, in practice only few projects can be found for which a traffic forecast 
exists for, say, the fifth year of operations and actual traffic was counted for this year so 
that inaccuracy may be systematically measured for this year. Many more projects can be 
found with information about forecasted and actual traffic for the first year of operations 
than for later years, because it appears to be common practice for both forecasters and 
those who evaluate the accuracy of forecasts to use first-year-of-operations as the basis 
for their work (Fouracre et al. 1990, Pickrell 1990, National Audit Office 1992, 
Walmsley and Pickett 1992, World Bank 1994).  
 Fifth and finally, if newly opened transport infrastructure projects have a 
systematic adaption period before traffic picks up, as claimed by many planners and 
promoters, this could and should be integrated in travel demand modeling. In this way 
adaption would be reflected in forecasts instead of being external to these. 
 
DATA AVAILABILITY 
Data that allow the calculation of inaccuracies in traffic forecasts unfortunately are 
relatively rare. For public sector projects, often the data are simply not produced. And 
even where the intention is to produce the data, projects may develop in ways that make 
it difficult or impossible to compare forecasted with actual traffic. For example, 
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forecasted traffic for a given project may be estimated for the opening year, but due to 
delays, which are common, the actual opening date turns out to be several years later 
than that forecasted, and no forecast of traffic was made for the actual opening year. In 
more general terms, methodological differences in how and on what basis forecasted and 
actual traffic are estimated often make comparisons difficult or impossible. Finally, for 
large projects the elapse of time from forecasts are made, until decision to build, until 
construction starts, until the project is completed, until operations begin, and until actual 
traffic can finally be counted may cover five, ten, or more years. Over such long time 
periods the assumptions underlying forecasts may be dated and incommensurate when 
compared to the assumption underlying the way actual traffic is measured, or initial plans 
to compare actual with forecasted traffic may be given up or simply forgotten.  
For private sector projects, traffic typically generates an income for the project 
owner. Budgeting and accounting is commercial, and therefore traffic forecasts and 
traffic counts tend to be more systematic and more conducive to comparative studies of 
forecasted and actual traffic than is the case for public sector projects. This typically does 
not help scholars much, however, because traffic data in private projects are often 
classified to keep them from the hands of competitors. And for both public and private 
projects, data that allow forecasted and actual traffic to be compared may be held back 
by project owners and managers because the size and direction of differences between 
forecasted and actual traffic may be of a kind that, if made public, would make the 
project look bad in the public eye, for instance where actual traffic is substantially lower 
than that forecasted.  
 
DATA USED IN THE PRESENT STUDY 
Despite the problems with scarcity of data described above, after four years of data 
collection and refinement we were able to develop a sample of 210 transportation 
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infrastructure projects with comparable data for forecasted and actual traffic. The sample 
comprises a project portfolio worth approximately US$58 billion in actual costs (2003 
prices). The project types are urban rail, high-speed rail, conventional rail, bridges, 
tunnels, highways, and freeways. The projects are located in 14 countries on 5 
continents, including both developed and developing nations. The projects were 
completed during the 30 years between 1969 and 1998. The size of the projects range 
from construction costs of US$22 million to 10 billion (2003 prices), with the smallest 
projects typically being stretches of roads in larger road schemes and the largest projects 
being rail links and fixed links (tunnels and bridges). As far as we know, this is the 
largest sample of projects with comparable data on forecasted and actual traffic that has 
been established for this type of project. 
The projects were selected for the sample on the basis of data availability. All 
projects that we know of for which comparable data on forecasted and actual traffic were 
obtainable were considered for inclusion in the sample. This was 485 projects. 275 
projects were then rejected because of unclear or insufficient data quality. More 
specifically, of the 275 projects rejected, 124 were rejected because inaccuracy had been 
estimated in ways different from and incomparable to the way we decided to estimate 
inaccuracy (see previous section); 151 projects were rejected because inaccuracies for 
these projects had been estimated on the basis of adjusted data for actual traffic instead 
of using original, actual data as we decided to do. All projects for which valid and 
reliable data were available were included in the sample. This covers both projects for 
which we ourselves collected the data, and projects for which other researchers in other 
studies did the data collection. 
 Our own data collection concentrated on large European projects, because too 
few data existed for this type of project to allow comparative studies. We collected 
primary data on the accuracy of traffic forecasts for 31 projects in Denmark, France, 
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Germany, Sweden, and the UK and were thus able to increase many times the number of 
large European projects with reliable data for both actual and estimated traffic, allowing 
for the first time comparative studies for this type of project where statistical methods 
can be applied. Other projects were included in the sample from the following studies: 
Webber (1976), Hall (1980), National Audit Office (1985), National Audit Office 
(1988), Fouracre, Allport and Thomson (1990), Pickrell (1990), Walmsley and Pickett 
(1992), Skamris (1994), Vejdirektoratet (1995). Statistical tests showed no differences 
between data collected through our own surveys and data collected from the studies 
carried out by other researchers. 
 As for any sample, a key question is whether the sample is representative of the 
population, here whether the projects included in the sample are representative of the 
population of transportation infrastructure projects. Since the criteria for sampling were 
data availability, validity, and reliability, this question translates into one of whether 
projects with available, valid, and reliable data are representative. There are four reasons 
why this is probably not the case. First, it has been argued that the very existence of data 
that make the evaluation of performance possible may contribute to improved 
performance when such data are used by project management to monitor projects (World 
Bank 1994: 17). Such projects would have better than average, i.e. non-representative, 
performance. Second, we might speculate that managers and promoters of projects with a 
particularly bad track record regarding traffic forecasts have an interest in not making 
traffic data available, which would then result in underrepresentation of such projects in 
the sample. Conversely, managers and promoters of projects with a good track record for 
traffic forecasts might be interested in making this public, resulting in overrepresentation 
of these projects. Third, even where managers have made traffic data available they may 
have chosen to give out data that present their projects in as favorable a light as possible. 
Often there are several forecasts of traffic to choose from and several compilations of 
 15 
actual traffic for a given project at a given time. If researchers collect data by means of 
survey questionnaires, as is often the case, there might be a temptation for managers to 
choose the combination of forecasted and actual traffic that suits them best, possibly a 
combination that makes their projects look good. An experienced researcher in a large 
European country, who was giving us feedback on our research for that country, 
commented on the data collection (the quote has been anonymized for obvious reasons): 
 
"Most of the [research] is based on [national railway] replies to a 
questionnaire. This is likely to create a systematic bias. [The national 
railways] cannot be trusted to tell you the truth on these matters. As you 
know very well, the concept of 'truth' in these matters is particularly fragile. 
The temptation for [the national railways] to take, for the forecasts, the 
number that suits them best, this temptation must be great, and I don't think 
they could resist it. What you would need [in order to obtain better data] 
would be the original forecast documents, preferably from the archives of 
the Ministry of Transportation (not [from the national railways]), that were 
utilised to take the decision." 
 
Other studies have documented the existence of such "cooking" of data (Wachs 1990). 
Unfortunately, in practice it proves difficult and often impossible to gain access to the 
original forecast documents. This is why we, and other researchers with us, sometimes 
have to rely on the second-best methodology of survey questionnaires. This is also why 
data are likely to be biased. Fourth, and finally, differences in the representativity of 
different subsamples may also result in non-representative data, for instance differences 
between rail and road. We will return to the latter point below. 
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 The available data do not allow an exact, empirical assessment of the magnitude 
of the problem of misrepresentation. But we conclude, for the reasons given above, that 
most likely the sample is biased and the bias is conservative. In other words, accuracy in 
traffic forecasts estimated from the sample would be higher than accuracy in traffic 
forecasts in the project population. This should be kept in mind when interpreting the 
results from the statistical analyses below. The sample is not perfect by any means. Still 
it is the best obtainable sample given the current state-of-the-art in this field of research. 
 In the statistical analyses, the percentage difference in the sample between actual 
and forecasted traffic is considered normally distributed unless otherwise stated. 
Residual plots, not shown here, indicate that normal distribution might not be completely 
satisfied, the rail data having two outliers and the distribution for roads being somewhat 
skewed with larger upper tails. For the latter, a logarithmic transformation could improve 
normality, but this has not been considered worthwhile, partly because the tests are fairly 
robust to deviations from normality, partly because it complicates the interpretation.  
 The subdivisions of the sample implemented as part of analyses entail 
methodological problems of their own. Thus the representation of observations in 
different combinations of subgroups is quite skew for the data considered. The analysis 
would be improved considerably if the representation were more even. Partial and 
complete confounding occur, that is, if a combination of two or more effects is 
significant it is sometimes difficult to decide whether one or the other, or both, cause the 
difference. For interactions, often not all the combinations are represented, or the 
representations can be quite scarce. Actually, few useful results concerning subgroups 
could be found for these reasons, and we have adapted our interpretations of the data to 
these limitations, needless to say. If better data could be gathered, sharper conclusions 
could be made.  
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 The statistical models used are linear normal models, i.e. analysis of variance and 
regression analysis with the appropriate F-tests and t-tests have been made. The tests of 
hypotheses concerning mean values are known to be robust to deviations from normality. 
For each test the p-value has been reported. This value is a measure for rareness if 
identity of groups is assumed. Traditionally, a p-value less than 0.01 is considered highly 
significant, less than 0.05 significant, whereas a larger p-value means that the deviation 
could be due to chance.  
 
 
Are Rail or Road Forecasts More Accurate? 
Figures 1 and 2 show the distribution of inaccuracy of traffic forecasts for the 210 
projects in the sample split into rail and road projects. Inaccuracy, as said, is measured as 
actual minus forecasted traffic in percentage of forecasted traffic. Thus perfect accuracy 
is indicated by zero; a negative figure indicates that actual traffic is that many percent 
lower than forecasted traffic; a positive figure indicates that actual traffic is that many 
percent higher than forecasted traffic. The most noticeable attribute of Figures 1 and 2 is 
the striking difference between rail and road projects. Rail passenger forecasts are much 
more inaccurate and biased (inflated) than are road traffic forecasts. 
 
[Figures 1-2 app. here] 
 
Tests show that of the 27 rail projects included in the statistical analyses, two German 
projects should be considered as statistical outliers. These are the two projects 
represented by the two rightmost columns in the rail histogram in Figure 1 and the two 
uppermost plots in the rail box-plot diagram shown in Figure 2. Statistical tests with and 
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without the two statistical outliers do not indicate any difference in terms of forecast 
inaccuracies between different types of rail projects, with the reservation that only urban 
rail has a reasonable representation (24 urban rail, 2 rail tunnels, 1 high-speed rail). 
Hence the rail projects are considered as an aggregate. Excluding statistical outliers, we 
find the following results for the remaining 25 rail projects (results including the two 
statistical outliers are given in square parentheses):  
 
• The data document a massive problem with inflated rail passenger forecasts. For 
more than 9 out of 10 rail projects passenger forecasts are overestimated; for 72 
percent of all rail projects, passenger forecasts are overestimated by more than 
two thirds. [Including statistical outliers: For 67 percent of all rail projects, 
passenger forecasts are overestimated by more than two thirds]. 
 
• Rail passenger forecasts were overestimated by an average of 105.6 percent (95 
percent confidence interval of 66.0 to 169.9), resulting in actual traffic that was 
on average 51.4 percent lower than forecasted traffic (sd=28.1, 95 percent 
confidence interval of -62.9 to -39.8). [Including statistical outliers: Rail 
passenger forecasts were overestimated by an average of 65.2 percent (95 
percent confidence interval of 23.1 to 151.3), resulting in actual traffic that was 
on average 39.5 percent lower than forecasted traffic (sd=52.4, 95 percent 
confidence interval of -60.2 to -18.8)]. 
 
• 84 percent of the rail projects have actual traffic more than 20 percent below 
forecasted traffic and none have actual traffic more than 20 percent above 
forecasted traffic. Even if we double the threshold value to 40 percent, we find 
that a solid 72 percent of all rail projects have actual traffic below that limit. 
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[Including statistical outliers the figures are 85 percent and 74 percent,  
respectively.] 
 
[Table 1 app. here] 
 
For road projects, we find with 95 percent confidence that there is no significant 
difference (p=0.638) in terms of forecast inaccuracies between vehicle traffic on 
highways, bridges, and in tunnels (170 highways, 10 bridges, 3 tunnels). Hence we 
consider the 183 road projects as an aggregate. Our tests show (see also Table 1): 
 
• 50 percent of the road projects have a difference between actual and forecasted 
traffic of more than ±20 percent. If we double the threshold value to ±40 
percent, we find that 25 percent of projects are above this level. 
 
• There is no significant difference between the frequency of inflated versus 
deflated forecasts for road vehicle traffic (p=0.822, two-sided binominal test). 
21.3 percent of projects have inaccuracies below -20 percent, whereas 28.4 
percent of projects have inaccuracies above +20 percent. 
 
• Road traffic forecasts were underestimated by an average of 8.7 percent (95 
percent confidence interval of 2.9 to 13.7), resulting in actual traffic that was on 
average 9.5 percent higher than forecasted traffic (sd=44.3, 95 percent 
confidence interval of 3.0 to 15.9).  
 
Thus the risk is substantial that road traffic forecasts are wrong by a large margin, but the 
risk is more balanced than for rail passenger forecasts. Testing the difference between 
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rail and road, we find at a very high level of statistical significance that rail passenger 
forecasts are less accurate and more inflated than road vehicle forecasts (p<0.001, Welch 
two-sample t-test). However, there is no indication of a significant difference between 
the standard deviations for rail and road forecasts, both are high, indicating a large 
element of uncertainty and risk for both types of forecasts (p=0.213, two-sided F-test). 
Excluding the two statistical outliers for rail, we find the standard deviation for rail 
projects to be significantly lower than for road projects, although still high (p=0.0105).  
 We conclude that the traffic estimates used in decision making for rail 
infrastructure development are highly, systematically, and significantly misleading. Rail 
passenger forecasts are consistently and significantly inflated. For road projects the 
problem of misleading forecasts is less severe and less one-sided than for rail. But even 
for roads, for half the projects the difference between actual and forecasted traffic is 
more than ±20 percent. On this background, planners and decision makers are well 
advised to take with a grain of salt any traffic forecast which does not explicitly take into 
account the uncertainty of predicting future traffic. For rail passenger forecasts, a grain 
of salt may not be enough. The data demonstrate to planners that risk assessment and 
management regarding travel demand must be an integral part of planning for both rail 
and road projects. The data presented above provide the empirical basis on which 
planners may found such risk assessment and management. 
 
 
Have Forecasts Become More Accurate Over Time? 
Figures 3 and 4 show how forecast inaccuracy varies over time for the projects in the 
sample for which inaccuracy could be coupled with information about year of decision to 
build and/or year of completing the project. There is no indication that traffic forecasts 
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have become more accurate over time. Quite the opposite for road projects, where 
forecasts appear to become highly inaccurate toward the end of the period. Statistical 
analyses corroborate this impression.  
 
[Figures 3-4 app. here] 
 
 For rail projects, forecast inaccuracy is independent of both year of project 
commencement or year of project conclusion. This is the case whether the two German 
projects (marked with "K" in Figure 3) are treated as statistical outliers or not. We 
conclude that forecasts of rail passenger traffic have not improved over time. Rail 
passenger traffic has been consistently overestimated during the 30-year period studied.  
 For road projects, inaccuracies are larger towards the end of the period with 
highly underestimated traffic. However, there is a difference between Danish and other 
road projects. For Danish road projects, we find at a very high level of statistical 
significance that inaccuracy varies with time (p<0.001). After 1980 Danish road traffic 
forecasts went completely wrong with gross underestimations of traffic, whereas this was 
not the case for Denmark before 1980, nor was it the case for other countries for which 
data exist. During a decade from the second half of the 1970's to the second half of the 
1980's, inaccuracy of Danish road traffic forecasts increased 18-fold, from 3 to 55 
percent (see Figure 5).  
 
[Figure 5 app. here] 
 
For Danish projects, the equation for the regression line for year of decision to build is: 
 
 I = 3.0 + 5.48 (Y - 1970) 
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where 
 I = Inaccuracy of traffic forecast in percent 
 Y = Year of decision to build 
 
 The Danish experience with increasing inaccuracy in road traffic forecasts is best 
explained by what Ascher (1979: 52, 202-203) calls "assumption drag," that is, the 
continued use of assumptions after their validity has been contradicted by the data. More 
specifically, traffic forecasters typically calibrate forecasting models on the basis of 
historical data. The so-called energy crises of 1973 and 1979 and associated increases in 
petrol prices plus decreases in real wages had a profound, if short-lived, effect on road 
traffic in Denmark, with traffic declining for the first time in decades. Danish traffic 
forecasters adjusted and calibrated their models accordingly on the assumption that they 
were witnessing an enduring trend. The assumption was mistaken. When, during the 
1980s, the effects of the two oil crises and related policy measures tapered off, traffic 
boomed again rendering forecasts made on 1970's assumptions highly inaccurate. 
 We conclude that accuracy in traffic forecasting has not improved over time. Rail 
passenger forecasts are as inaccurate, that is, inflated, today as they were 30 years ago. 
Road vehicle forecasts even appear to have become more inaccurate over time with large 
underestimations towards the end of the 30-year period studied. If techniques and skills 
for arriving at accurate traffic forecasts have improved over time, this does not show in 
the data. This suggests to planners that the most effective means for improving 
forecasting accuracy is probably not improved models but, instead, more realistic 
assumptions and systematic use of empirically based assessment of uncertainty and risk. 
For rail, in particular, the persistent existence over time of highly inflated passenger 
forecasts invites speculation that an equilibrium has been reached where strong 
incentives and weak disincentives for overestimating passenger traffic may have taught 
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project promoters what there is to learn, namely that overestimated passenger forecasts 
pay off: in combination with underestimated costs such forecasts help misrepresent rail 
projects to decision makers in ways that help get rail projects approved and built 
(Flyvbjerg, Bruzelius, and Rothengatter 2003). This suggests that improved accuracy for 
rail forecasts will require strong measures of accountability that would curb strategic 
misrepresentation in forecasts. 
 
 
Effects of Project Size, Length of Implementation Phase, and 
Geography 
Testing for effect on forecasting inaccuracy as dependent variable from size of project as 
independent variable, we used linear regression analyses measuring size of project by 
estimated costs, estimated number of passengers, and estimated number of vehicles.i As 
the distributions of estimated costs, estimated number of passengers, and estimated 
number of vehicles are all skew, the logarithms of these have also been used as 
explanatory variables. 
 For rail projects, based on 17 cases we found that inaccuracies in passenger 
forecasts are not significantly dependent on costs (p=0.177), but do have significance 
dependent on logarithm of costs (p=0.018), with higher costs leading to higher 
inaccuracies. Based on 27 cases, inaccuracies in passenger forecasts are not significantly 
dependent on estimated size of number of passengers, neither directly (p=0.738) nor 
taking logarithms (p=0.707). 
 For road projects, based on 24 cases, inaccuracies in vehicle forecast are not 
significantly dependent on costs, neither directly (p=0.797) nor logarithmically 
(p=0.114). Based on 51 cases, inaccuracies in vehicle forecast are significantly 
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dependent on estimated number of vehicles, both directly (p=0.011) and even stronger 
taking logarithms (p<0.001), with smaller projects tending to have the most inaccurate, 
underestimated, traffic forecasts. 
 We know of only one other study that relates inaccuracy in travel demand 
forecasting with size of project (Maldonado 1990, quoted in Mierzejewski 1995: 31). 
Based on data from 22 US airports, this study found that inaccuracy in aviation 
forecasting did not correlate with size of facility. 
 Additional tests indicate no effect on inaccuracy from length of project 
implementation phase, defined as the time period from decision to build a project until 
operations begin. More data are needed in order to study the effect on inaccuracy from 
geographic location of projects and type of ownership. With the available data, there is 
no significant difference between geographical areas, which suggests that until such a 
time when more data are available, planners may pool data from different geographical 
areas when carrying out risk assessment. 
 
 
Causes of inaccuracies and bias in traffic forecasts 
The striking difference in forecasting inaccuracy between rail and road projects 
documented above may possibly be explained by the different procedures that apply to 
how each type of project is funded, where competition for funds are typically more 
pronounced for rail than for road, which creates an incentive for rail promoters to present 
their project in as favorable a light as possible, that is, with overestimated benefits and 
underestimated costs (see more in Flyvbjerg, Holm, and Buhl 2002). One may further 
speculate that rail patronage will be overestimated and road traffic underestimated in 
instances where there is a strong political or ideological desire to see passengers shifted 
 25 
from road to rail, for instance for reasons of congestion or protection of the environment. 
Forecasts here become part of the political rhetoric aimed at showing voters that 
something is being done--or will be done--about the problems at hand. In such cases it 
may be difficult for forecasters and planners to argue for more realistic forecasts, because 
politicians here use forecasts to show political intent, not the most likely outcome.  
 In order to arrive at a more systematic analysis of causes of inaccuracies in traffic 
forecasts, we identified such causes for 234 transportation infrastructure projects. For a 
number of projects we were able to identify causes of inaccuracies but not the numerical 
size of inaccuracies. This explains why we have more projects (234) in this part of our 
analysis than in the previous part (210 projects).ii Causes of inaccuracies are stated 
causes that explain differences between actual and forecasted traffic for the first year of 
operations or the opening year. For the projects for which we did the data collection, 
project managers were asked to account for the factors that would explain why actual 
traffic was different from forecasted traffic. For the other projects the stated causes are a 
mixture of this type of statement by managers supplemented by statements by 
researchers about what caused such differences. For these projects, the data do not allow 
an exact distinction between manager statements and researcher statements, even though 
such a distinction would be desirable. It is a problem with using stated causes that what 
people say they do is often significantly different from what they actually do. 
Uncovering revealed causes for inaccuracy in traffic forecasting is therefore an important 
area for further research. For the time being we have to make do with stated causes.
 Figure 6 shows the stated causes for inaccuracies in traffic forecasts for rail and 
road, respectively. For each transportation mode and stated cause, a column shows the 
percentage of projects for which this cause was stated as a reason for inaccuracy.  
 
[Figure 6 app. here] 
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Again the results are highly different for rail and road. For rail projects, the two most 
important stated causes are "uncertainty about trip distribution" and "deliberately slanted 
forecasts." Trip distribution in rail passenger forecasts is often adapted to fit national or 
urban policies aimed at boosting rail traffic. But such policies frequently fail and the 
result is the type of overestimated passenger forecast which we have documented above 
as typical for rail passenger forecasting. As regards deliberately slanted forecasts, such 
forecasts are fabricated by rail promoters in order to increase the likelihood that rail 
projects get built (Wachs 1990). Such forecasts exaggerate passenger traffic and thus 
revenues. Elsewhere we have shown that the massive overestimation of traffic and 
revenues documented above for rail goes hand-in-hand with an equally massive 
underestimation of costs (Flyvbjerg, Holm, and Buhl 2002, 2004). The result is cost-
benefit analyses of rail projects that are highly inflated, with benefit-cost ratios that are 
contrived with a view to getting projects accepted and built. 
 For road projects, the two most often stated causes for inaccurate traffic forecasts 
are uncertainties about "trip generation" and "land-use development." Trip generation is 
based on traffic counts and demographic and geographical data. Such data are often 
dated and incomplete and forecasters quote this as a main source of uncertainty in road 
traffic forecasting. Forecasts of land-use development are based on land-use plans. What 
is actually implemented is often quite different from what is planned, however. This, 
again, is a source of uncertainty in forecasting. 
 The different patterns in stated causes for rail and road, respectively, fit well with 
the figures for actual forecast inaccuracies documented above. Rail forecasts are 
systematically and significantly overestimated to a degree that indicates foul play on the 
part of rail forecasters and promoters. The stated causes, with "deliberately slanted 
forecasts" as the second to largest category, corroborate this interpretation, which 
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corresponds with findings by Wachs (1986) and Flyvbjerg, Holm, and Buhl (2002). Road 
forecasts are also often inaccurate, but they are substantially more balanced than rail 
forecasts, which indicate a higher degree of fair play in road forecasting. This 
interpretation is corroborated by the fact that deliberately slanted forecasts are not quoted 
as a main cause of inaccuracy for road traffic forecasts, whereas more technical factors 
like trip generation and land-use development are. This is not to say that road traffic 
forecasts are never politically manipulated. It is to say, however, that this appears to 
happen much less often and much less systematically for road than for rail projects. It is 
also not to say that road projects generally have a stronger justification than rail projects; 
just that they have less biased forecasts than rail projects. 
 
 
What Forecasters Can Do To Reduce Inaccuracy, Bias, and Risk 
The results presented above show that it is highly risky to rely on travel demand 
forecasts to plan and implement large transportation infrastructure investments. Rail 
passenger forecasts are overestimated in 9 out of 10 cases, with an average overestimate 
above 100 percent. Half of all road traffic forecasts are wrong by more than ±20 percent. 
Forecasts have not become more accurate over time. This state of affairs points directly 
to better risk assessment and management as something planners could and should do to 
improve planning and decision making for transportation infrastructure projects. Today, 
the benefit risks generated by inaccurate travel demand forecasts are widely ignored or 
underestimated in planning, just as cost risks are neglected (Flyvbjerg, Holm, and Buhl 
2003). 
 When contemplating what planners can do to reduce inaccuracy, bias, and risk in 
forecasting, we need to distinguish between two fundamentally different situations, 
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namely the situation where planners consider it important to get forecasts right and the 
situation where they don't. We consider the first situation in this section and the second 
in the following section.  
If planners genuinely consider it important to get forecasts right, we recommend 
they use a new forecasting method called "reference forecasting" to reduce inaccuracy 
and bias. This method was originally developed to compensate for the type of cognitive 
bias in human forecasting that psychologist Daniel Kahneman found in his Nobel prize-
winning work on bias in economic forecasting (Kahneman 1994, Kahneman and Tversky 
1979). Reference forecasting has proven more accurate than conventional forecasting. 
We are currently developing this method in detail for practical demand and cost 
forecasting in transportation. For reasons of space, here we present only an outline of the 
method, based mainly on Lovallo and Kahneman (2003). 
Reference forecasting consists in taking a so-called "outside view" on the 
particular project being forecast. The outside view is established on the basis of 
information from a class of similar projects. The outside view does not try to forecast the 
specific uncertain events that will affect the particular project, but instead places the 
project in a statistical distribution of outcomes from a group of reference projects. 
Reference forecasting requires the following three steps for the individual project: 
 
(1) Identification of a relevant reference class of past projects. The class must be 
broad enough to be statistically meaningful but narrow enough to be truly 
comparable with the specific project. 
 
(2) Establishing a probability distribution for the selected reference class. 
This requires access to credible data for a sufficient number of projects within 
the reference class to make statistically meaningful conclusions. 
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(3) Compare the specific project with the reference class distribution, in order to 
establish the most likely outcome for the specific project.  
 
Daniel Kahneman relates the following story to illustrate reference forecasting in 
practice (Lovallo and Kahneman 2003, 61). Some years ago, Kahneman was involved in 
a project to develop a curriculum for a new subject area for high schools in Israel. The 
project was carried out by a team of academics and teachers. In time, the team began to 
discuss how long the project would take to complete. Everyone on the team was asked to 
write on a slip of paper the number of months needed to finish and report the project. The 
estimates ranged from 18 to 30 months. One of the team members--a distinguished 
expert in curriculum development--was then posed a challenge by another team member 
to recall as many projects similar to theirs as possible and to think of these projects as 
they were in a stage comparable to their project. "How long did it take them at that point 
to reach completion?", the expert was asked. After a while, he answered, with some 
discomfort, that not all the comparable teams he could think of ever did complete their 
task. About 40 percent of them eventually gave up. Of those remaining, the expert could 
not think of any that completed their task in less than seven years, nor of any that took 
more than ten. The expert was then asked if he had reason to believe that the present 
team was more skilled in curriculum development than the earlier ones had been. The 
expert said no, he did not see any relevant factor that distinguished this team favorably 
from the teams he had been thinking about. His impression was that the present team was 
slightly below average in terms of resources and potential. The wise decision at this point 
would probably have been for the team to break up, according to Kahneman. Instead, the 
members ignored the pessimistic information and proceeded with the project. They 
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finally completed the project eight years later, and their efforts went largely wasted--the 
resulting curriculum was rarely used. 
 In this example, the curriculum expert made two forecasts for the same problem 
and arrived at very different answers. The first forecast was the inside view; the second 
was the outside view, or the reference forecast. The inside view is the one that the expert 
and the other team members adopted. They made forecasts by focusing tightly on the 
case at hand, considering its objective, the resources they brought to it, and the obstacles 
to its completion. They constructed in their minds scenarios of their coming progress and 
extrapolated current trends into the future. The resulting forecasts, even the most 
conservative ones, were overly optimistic. The outside view is the one provoked by the 
question to the curriculum expert. It completely ignored the details of the project at hand, 
and it involved no attempt at forecasting the events that would influence the project's 
future course. Instead, it examined the experiences of a class of similar projects, laid out 
a rough distribution of outcomes for this reference class, and then positioned the current 
project in that distribution. The resulting forecast, as it turned out, was much more 
accurate. 
 Similarly--to take an example from city planning--planners in a city preparing to 
build a new subway would, first, establish a reference class of comparable projects. This 
could be the urban rail projects included in the sample for this article. Through analyses 
the planners would establish that the projects included in the reference class were indeed 
comparable. Second, if the planners were concerned about getting patronage forecasts 
right, they would then establish the distribution of outcomes for the reference class 
regarding the accuracy of patronage forecasts. This distribution would look something 
like the rail part of Figure 1. Third, the planners would compare their subway project to 
the reference class distribution. This would make it clear to the planners that unless they 
had reason to believe they are substantially better forecasters and planners than their 
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colleagues who did the forecasts and planning for projects in the reference class, they are 
likely to grossly overestimate patronage. Finally, planners may then use this knowledge 
to adjust their forecasts for more realism. 
 The contrast between inside and outside views has been confirmed by systematic 
research (Gilovich, Griffin, and Kahneman 2002). The research shows that when people 
are asked simple questions requiring them to take an outside view, their forecasts become 
significantly more accurate. However, most individuals and organizations are inclined to 
adopt the inside view in planning major initiatives. This is the conventional and intuitive 
approach. The traditional way to think about a complex project is to focus on the project 
itself and its details, to bring to bear what one knows about it, paying special attention to 
its unique or unusual features, trying to predict the events that will influence its future. 
The thought of going out and gathering simple statistics about related cases seldom 
enters a planner's mind. This is the case in general, according to Lovallo and Kahneman 
(2003, 61-62). And it is certainly the case for travel demand forecasting. Despite the 
many forecasts we have reviewed, for instance for this article, we have not come across a 
single genuine reference class forecast of travel demand.iii If our readers have 
information about such forecasts, we would appreciate their feedback for our on-going 
work on this issue. 
 While understandable, planners' preference for the inside view over the outside 
view is unfortunate. When both forecasting methods are applied with equal skill, the 
outside view is much more likely to produce a realistic estimate. That is because it 
bypasses cognitive and organizational biases such as appraisal optimism and strategic 
misrepresentation and cuts directly to outcomes. In the outside view planners and 
forecasters are not required to make scenarios, imagine events, or gauge their own and 
others' levels of ability and control, so they cannot get all these things wrong. Surely the 
outside view,  being based on historical precedent, may fail to predict extreme outcomes, 
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that is, those that lie outside all historical precedents. But for most projects, the outside 
view will produce more accurate results. In contrast, a focus on inside details is the road 
to inaccuracy. 
 The comparative advantage of the outside view is most pronounced for non-
routine projects, understood as projects that planners and decision makers in a certain 
locale have never attempted before--like building an urban rail system in a city for the 
first time, or a new major bridge or tunnel where none existed before. It is in the 
planning of such new efforts that the biases toward optimism and strategic 
misrepresentation are likely to be large. To be sure, choosing the right reference class of 
comparative past projects becomes more difficult when planners are forecasting 
initiatives for which precedents are not easily found, for instance the introduction of new 
and unfamiliar technologies. However, most large-scale transportation projects are both 
non-routine locally and use well-known technologies. Such projects are, therefore, 
particularly likely to benefit from the outside view and reference forecasting. 
 
 
When Forecasters Mislead With Numbers 
In the present section we consider the situation where planners and other influential 
actors do not find it important to get forecasts right and where planners, therefore, do not 
help to clarify and mitigate risk but, instead, generate and exacerbate it. Here planners 
are part of the problem, not the solution. This situation may need some explication, 
because it possibly sounds to many like an unlikely state of affairs. After all, it may be 
agreed that planners ought to be interested in being accurate and unbiased in forecasting. 
It is even stated as an explicit requirement in the AICP Code of Ethics and Professional 
Conduct that "A planner must strive to provide full, clear and accurate information on 
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planning issues to citizens and governmental decision-makers" (American Planning 
Association 1991, A.3), and we certainly agree with the Code.  The British RTPI has laid 
down similar obligations for its members (Royal Town Planning Institute 2001). 
Then again, the literature is replete with things planners and planning "must" 
strive to do, but which they don't. Planning must be open and communicative, but often it 
is closed. Planning must be participatory and democratic, but often it is an instrument to 
dominate and control. Planning must be about rationality, but often it is about power 
(Flyvbjerg 1998, Watson 2003). This is the "dark side" of planning and planners 
identified by Flyvbjerg (1996) and Yiftachel (1998), which is remarkably underexplored 
by planning researchers and theorists.  
Forecasting,  too, has its dark side. It is here we find Wachs' (1989) lying 
planners. They are busy, not with getting forecasts right and following the AICP Code of 
Ethics, but with getting projects funded and built. And accurate forecasts are often not an 
effective means for achieving this objective. Indeed, accurate forecasts may be 
counterproductive, whereas biased forecasts may be effective in competing for funds and 
securing the go-ahead for construction. "The most effective planner," says Wachs (1989, 
477), "is sometimes the one who can cloak advocacy in the guise of scientific or 
technical rationality." Such advocacy would stand in direct opposition to AICP's ruling 
that "the planner's primary obligation [is] to the public interest" (American Planning 
Association 1991, B.2). Nevertheless, seemingly rational forecasts that underestimate 
costs and overestimate benefits have long been an established formula for project 
approval (Flyvbjerg, Bruzelius, and Rothengatter 2003). Forecasting is here just another 
kind of rent-seeking behavior. The consequence is a Machiavellian make-believe world 
of misrepresentation, which makes it extremely difficult to decide which projects deserve 
undertaking and which do not. The result is, as even one of the industry's own organs, the 
Oxford-based Major Projects Association, acknowledges, that too many projects proceed 
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that should not. We would like to add that many projects don't proceed that probably 
should, had they not lost out to projects with "better" misrepresentation (Flyvbjerg, 
Holm, and Buhl 2002). 
In this situation, the question is not so much what planners can do to reduce 
inaccuracy and risk in forecasting, but what others can do to impose on planners the 
checks and balances that would give planners the incentive to stop producing biased 
forecasts and begin to work according to their Code of Ethics. The challenge is to change 
the rules of the power play which governs forecasting and project development. Here 
better forecasting techniques and appeals to ethics won't do; institutional change with a 
focus on accountability is necessary.  
Two basic types of accountability define liberal democracies: (1) Public sector 
accountability through transparency and public control, and (2) Private sector 
accountability via competition and market control. Both types of accountability may be 
effective tools to curb planners' misrepresentation in forecasting and to promote a culture 
which acknowledges and deals effectively with risk. In order to achieve accountability 
through transparency and public control, the following would be required as practices 
embedded in the relevant institutions: 
 
• National-level government should not offer discretionary grants to local 
infrastructure agencies for the sole purpose of building a specific type of 
infrastructure, for instance rail. Such grants create perverse incentives. Instead, 
national government should simply offer "infrastructure grants" or 
"transportation grants" to local governments, and let local political officials 
spend the funds however they choose to, but make sure that every dollar they 
spend on one type of infrastructure reduces their ability to fund another. 
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• Forecasts should be made subject to independent peer review. Where large 
amounts of taxpayers' money are at stake, such review may be carried out by 
national or state accounting and auditing offices, like the General Accounting 
Office in the US or the National Audit Office in the UK, who have the 
independence and expertise to produce such reviews. Other types of 
independent review bodies may be established, for instance within national 
departments of finance or with relevant professional bodies. 
 
• Forecasts should be benchmarked against comparable forecasts, for instance 
using reference class forecasting as described in the previous section. 
 
• Forecasts, peer reviews, and benchmarkings should be made available to the 
public as they are produced, including all relevant documentation. 
 
• Public hearings, citizen juries, and the like should be organized to allow 
stakeholders and civil society to voice criticism and support of forecasts. 
Knowledge generated in this way should be integrated in planning and decision 
making. 
 
• Scientific and professional conferences should be organized where forecasters 
would present and defend their forecasts in the face of colleagues' scrutiny and 
criticism. 
 
• Projects with inflated benefit-cost ratios should be reconsidered and stopped if 
recalculated costs and benefits do not warrant implementation. Projects with 
realistic estimates of benefits and costs should be rewarded.  
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• Professional and occasionally even criminal penalties should be enforced for 
planners and forecasters who consistently and foreseeably produce deceptive 
forecasts. An example of a professional penalty would be the exclusion from 
one’s professional organization if one violates its code of ethics. An example of 
a criminal penalty would be punishment as the result of prosecution before a 
court or similar legal set-up, for instance where deceptive forecasts have led to 
substantial mismanagement of public funds (Garett and Wachs, 1996). 
Malpractice in planning should be taken as seriously as it is in other professions. 
Failing to do this amounts to not taking the profession of planning seriously. 
 
In order to achieve accountability in forecasting via competition and market control, the 
following would be required, again as practices that are both embedded in and enforced 
by the relevant institutions: 
 
• The decision to go ahead with a project should, where at all possible, be made 
contingent on the willingness of private financiers to participate without a 
sovereign guarantee for at least one third of the total capital needs.iv This should 
be required whether projects pass the market test or not, that is, whether projects 
are subsidized or not or provided for social justice reasons or not. Private 
lenders, shareholders, and stock market analysts would produce their own 
forecasts or would critically monitor existing ones. If they were wrong about the 
forecasts, they and their organizations would be hurt. The result would be more 
realistic forecasts and reduced risk.  
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• Full public financing or full financing with a sovereign guarantee should be 
avoided. 
 
• Forecasters and their organizations must share financial responsibility for 
covering benefit shortfalls (and cost overruns) resulting from misrepresentation 
and bias in forecasting. 
 
• The participation of risk capital should not mean that government gives up or 
reduces control of the project. On the contrary, it means that government can 
more effectively play the role it should be playing, namely as the ordinary 
citizen's guarantor for ensuring concerns about safety, environment, risk, and a 
proper use of public funds. 
 
If the institutions with responsibility for developing and building major transportation 
infrastructure project would effectively implement, embed, and enforce such measures of 
accountability, then the misrepresentation in transportation forecasting, which is 
widespread today, may be mitigated. If this is not done, misrepresentation is likely to 
continue, and the allocation of funds for transportation investments is likely to be 
wasteful. 
 
 
Conclusions 
We conclude that the patronage estimates used by planners of rail infrastructure 
development are highly, systematically, and significantly misleading (inflated). This 
results in large benefit shortfalls for rail projects. For road projects the problem of 
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misleading forecasts is less severe and less one-sided than for rail. But even for roads, for 
half the projects the difference between actual and forecasted traffic is more than ±20 
percent. On this background, planners and decision makers are well advised to take with 
a grain of salt any traffic forecast which does not explicitly take into account the 
uncertainty of predicting future traffic. For rail passenger forecasts, a grain of salt may 
not be enough. 
 The risks generated from misleading forecasts are typically ignored or 
downplayed in infrastructure planning, to the detriment of social and economic welfare. 
Risks, therefore, have a doubly negative effect in this particular type of planning, since it 
is one thing to take on a risk that one has calculated and is prepared to take, much as 
insurance companies and professional investors do, while it is quite another matter--that 
moves risk-taking to a different and more problematic level--to ignore risks. This is 
especially the case when risks are of the magnitude we have documented here, with 
many demand forecasts being off by more than 50 percent on investments that measure 
in hundreds of millions of dollars. Such behavior is bound to produce losers among those 
financing infrastructure, be they tax payers or private investors. If the losers, or, for 
future projects, potential losers, want to protect themselves, then our study shows that the 
risk of faulty forecasts, and related risk assessment and management, must be placed at 
the core of planning and decision making. Our goal with this article has been to take a 
first step in this direction by developing the necessary data and approach. 
 The policy implications of our findings are clear. First, the findings show that a 
major planning and policy problem--namely misinformation--exists for this highly 
expensive field of public policy. Second, the size and perseverance over time of the 
problem of misinformation indicate that it will not go away by merely pointing out its 
existence and appealing to the good will of project promoters and planners to make more 
accurate forecasts. The problem of misinformation is an issue of power and profit and 
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must be dealt with as such, using the mechanisms of transparency and accountability we 
commonly use in liberal democracies to mitigate rent-seeking behavior and the misuse of 
power. To the extent that planners partake in rent-seeking behavior and misuse of power, 
this may be seen as a violation of their code of ethics, that is, malpractice. Such 
malpractice should be taken seriously by the responsible institutions. Failing to do so 
amounts to not taking the profession of planning seriously. 
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Table 1: Inaccuracy in forecasts of rail passenger and road vehicle traffic. 
 Rail 
[figures in square parentheses 
include two statistical outliers] 
Road 
Average inaccuracy (%) -51.4 (sd=28.1) 
[-39.5 (sd=52.4)] 
9.5 (sd=44.3) 
Percentage of projects with 
inaccuracies larger than 
±20% 
84 
[85] 
50 
Percentage of projects with 
inaccuracies larger than 
±40% 
72 
[74] 
25 
Percentage of projects with 
inaccuracies larger than 
±60% 
40 
[41] 
13 
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FIGURE 1: Inaccuracies of traffic forecasts in transportation infrastructure projects split 
into 27 rail and 183 road projects 
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FIGURE 2: Inaccuracies of traffic forecasts in 210 transportation infrastructure 
projects 
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FIGURE 3: Inaccuracy in number of rail passengers 
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FIGURE 4: Inaccuracy in number of road vehicles 
 51 
 
 
FIGURE 5: Inaccuracy in number of road vehicles for Danish projects 
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FIGURE 6: Stated causes of inaccuracies in traffic forecasts, 26 rail projects and 208 
road projects 
 
                                                
i We find that the estimated quantities are better than the actual quantities as a measure for project size in 
the evaluation of inaccuracy, because the estimates are what is known about size at the time of decision to 
build (and the time of making the forecasts) and using actual quantities would result in the mixing of cause 
and effect. 
ii As in the other parts of our analyses, here too we include both projects for which we ourselves collected 
primary data and projects for which other researchers did the data collection as part of other studies, which 
we then used as secondary sources. Again our own data collection concentrated on large European 
projects, because data were particularly wanting for this project type. By means of a survey questionnaire 
and meetings with project managers we collected primary data on causes of inaccurate traffic forecasts for 
16 projects, while we collected secondary data for 218 projects from the following studies: Webber (1976), 
Hall (1980), National Audit Office (1988), Fouracre et al. (1990), Pickrell (1990), Wachs (1990), Leavitt et 
al. (1993), UK Department of Transportation (1993), Skamris (1994), and Vejdirektoratet (1995). 
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iii The closest we have come to an outside view on travel demand forecasts is Gordon and Wilson's (1984) 
use of regression analysis on an international cross section of light-rail projects to forecast patronage in a 
number of light-rail schemes in North America. 
iv The lower limit of a one-third share of private risk capital for such capital to effectively influence 
accountability is based on practical experience. See more in Flyvbjerg, Bruzelius, and Rothengatter (2003, 
120-123). 
